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clusion that the dividend payments made to respondent's stockholders were in-
come realized by it," Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out, "marks no innovation in
income tax law ..... 'Income is not any the less taxable income of the tax-
payer because by his command it is paid directly to another in performance of
the taxpayer's obligation to that other.' "34
These cases are distinguishable from each other and from the types dis-
cussed above; yet, a common element exists in all. It is fairly easy to see that a
corporation should pay income tax on income distributed to its stockholders, or
that one should be taxed on income used by him to discharge a continuing obli-
gation of support.3s Little violence is done, moreover, when the Court compels
a man to pay income tax on the income from land in which he has the capital
investment and of which he may direct the exploitation. The common element
in these cases is the dominion over a thing which constitutes the major premise
of the most sophisticated notions of ownership.36 With this in mind, taxation of
the income of a trust to one who has retained the right to vote the stock compos-
ing the corpus, for example, does not seem a tour de force. And the opinion in
the Horst case, besides its straightforward warning, refines the elemental con-
ceptions of ownership relevant to income taxation.
PICKETING FOR CLOSED SHOP-CON-
STITUTIONALLY ENJOINABLE?
The defendant union, aiding a strike for a closed shop, was enjoined from
picketing. On appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed the decree,
asserting that it did not violate the First Amendment. Fashioneraft v. Halpern.'
It has now been almost two years since the United States Supreme Court held
picketing to be guaranteed under the right of free speech.2 During that time,
critics have been skeptical of the doctrine;3 state courts and lower federal courts
have shown a decided distaste for it;4 and the Supreme Court itself has twice re-
stricted its applicability. First, in Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Meadowmnoor
34 Ibid., at 49.
3S See Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. i54 (1942) (settlor held taxable for all the income of a
trust which might be used for the maintenance and support of his minor children).
36 Ames, The Nature of Ownership, in Lectures on Legal History 192 (3913); cf. Holmes,
The Common Law 2o6 et seq. (is8i).
x 48 N.E. 2d (Mass. x943). 2 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (i94i).
3 Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56 Harv. L. Rev. i8 (1942); Gregory, Peaceful Picket-
ing and Freedom of Speech, 26 A.B.A.J. 709 (r940). But see Jaffe, In Defense of the Supreme
Court's Picketing Doctrine, 41 Mich. L. Rev. 1037 (1943); Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech:
A Dissent, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 513 (1942); Sherwood, the Picketing Cases and How They Grew,
io Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 763 (1942).
4 The attitude of these courts is discussed in Objective Tests for Determining the Legality
of Labor Activities, 41 Mich. L. Rev. 1143 (1943); Ratner and Come, The Norris-La Guardia *
Act in the Constitution, ix Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 428 (z943); Teller, op. cit. supra note 3, at 453.
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Dairies,5 an injunction was upheld where violence had been used. Second, in
Carpenters and Joiners Union of America v. Ritter's Cafe,6 the Court held that
the picketers and the parties picketed must occupy the same "area in in-
dustry.")
The Massachusetts court now proposes a third limitation, namely, that
picketing be prohibited wherever it is "directed to the accomplishment of an
unlawful purpose." 8 Since a strike for a closed shop is still a tort in Massachu-
setts,9 picketing in support of such a strike is said to have "an unlawful pur-
pose."'Y The court cites the Meadowmoor case for the proposition that unlawful
methods make picketing enjoinable. And if unlawful methods may have this
effect, why not unlawful ends, asks the court.
Actually, of course, the Meadowmoor decision was based, not upon the meth-
ods used, but upon the "clear and present danger" which was thought to have
resulted from those methods. If the "lawful objective" test achieves acceptance,
it will do so, then, not as an inevitable corollary to some "lawful means" test,
but simply because the Supreme Court has recognized that picketing mhay be
coercive as well as informative, and hence that its regulation is not totallybarred
by the free speech guaranty.
In the Meadowmoor and the Ritter's Cafe cases, the Court began the task of
outlining the area of permissive restriction. Whether it will proceed by adopting
the "lawful objective" criterion is, of course, conjectural." It indicated in a dic-
tum last year that it might.12 However, the test is exceedingly vague, and its
5 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
6315 U.S. 722 (1942). 7 Ibid., at 728.
8 Fashioncraft v. Halpern, 48 N.E. 2d 1, 5 (Mass. 1943).
9 Quinton's Market v. Patterson, 303 Mass. 315, 21 N.E. 2d 546 (1939); Simon v. Schwach-
man, 301 Mass. 573, i8 N.E. 2d 1 (1938).
zo To say, as does the Massachusetts court, that the strike has an unlawful objective be-
cause it seeks a closed shop, and that the picketing has an unlawful objective because it sup-
ports the unlawful strike, seems unnecessarily complicated. Actually, both the strike and the
picketing are motivated by the desire for a closed shop, and hence both must be unlawful
under Massachusetts law, as expressed in the instant case, at 3: "Whatever advantage might
in general accrue to trade unionism by the acquisition of a closed shop arrangement with an
employer, there is not sufficient relationship between the aim sought and the self interest of
the strikers to justify the intentional infliction of harm on another."
" It has been suggested that, instead, the Court will follow the criteria already enunciated,
though for a different purpose. Section 4 of the Norris-La Guardia Act and the cases decided
thus far under the Thornhill doctrine are analyzed to support this.theory. Ratner and Come,
op. cit. supra note 4.
"2 "The respondents say that the basis of the decision below was revealed in a subsequent
opinion of the Court of Appeals, where it was said with regard to the present case that 'we
held that it was an unlawful labor objective to attempt to coerce a peddler employing no em-
ployees in his business and making approximately thirty-two dollars a week, to hire an em-
ployee at nine dollars a day for one day a week.' Opera-on-Tour v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348,
357, 34 N.E. 2d 349, certiorari denied, 314 U.S. 615. But this lacks the deliberateness and
formality of a certification, and was uttered in a case where the question of the existence of a
NOTES AND RECENT CASES
past abuse is well known.3 Critics who advocate its adoption do so, naturally,
because they recognize the need for a thoroughgoing judicial consideration of
labor's objectives, a consideration which the present Court has so far, to a large
extent, inhibited.4 A better answer to this need, however, would seem to be a
weighing and sifting of these objectives by the Supreme Court itself.
TEE REPORT ON THE DETROIT RACE RIOT
Perhaps unfortunately, the legal system can take but a passive part in the
prevention of race riots. This is true because the chief underlying cause of such
conflicts is a maldirection of character. Racial harmony is not a matter of get-
ting good laws on the books or even of perfecting legal administration. This
harmony will come only when individuals acquire a compelling habit of acting
justly.
Yet, much of the material damage and many of the tragedies of the Detroit
riot could have been prevented by skilful legal action. In the factual report'
submitted to Governor Kelly of Michigan, Herbert J. Rushton, Attorney-Gen-
eral, William E. Dowling, Prosecuting Attorney, Oscar Olander, Commissioner
of State Police, and John H. Witherspoon, Commissioner of the Detroit Police
Department-the appointed committee of investigation-pointed out that an
adequate police force might have done much to minimize the human and ma-
terial damage.' More important to the subject of this note, the committee also
indicated that if federal military aid could have been secured speedily, much of
the damage might have been avoided.3
right to free speech under the Fourteenth Amendment was neither raised nor considered."
Bakery and Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 774-75 (1942).
Of this, Teller says, "Apparently then, the Supreme Court would have sustained the in-
junction had the New York Court of Appeals made a finding that the picketing was for an un-
lawful labor objective." Teller, op. cit. supra note 3, at 193.
13 Mr. Justice Frankfurter has given one of the ablest descriptions of this abuse. Frank-
furter and Greene, The Labor Injunction (193o).
14 Gregory, Peacetime Restraints on Collective Bargaining, io Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 177
(1943); Teller, op. cit. supra note 3; Teller, Focal Problems in American Labor Law-Opera-
on-Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 28 Va. L. Rev. 727 (1942); Arnold, Bottlenecks of Business c. ii
(1940).
'The purpose of the Report as stated in its Foreword is "to make publicly known the whole
truth in respect to the rioting." The three parts of the Report deal with (I) a statement of the
events, (II) an appendix composed of a series of statistical exhibits, and (II) a discussion by
the compilers of the various factors contributing to the tension between the white and negro
populations of Detroit.
' Instead of increasing proportionally with the half-million increase in population since
1931, the Detroit police force has decreased steadily and considerably since then. In 1931 the
population of Detroit was 1,526,763, and the actual personnel of the police force was then
3749. In 1943 the population is 2,io6,671, and the police force is now 3418. Exhibit io, Part
II, Factual Report to the Governor.
3 Ibid., Exhibit 12.
